norms. Patriarchy, age hierarchies, gender norms, and filial obedience made any criticism of parental authority "anathema" (36-37). All of these factors tended to shut down difficult discussions about the wartime past, especially with regards to perpetrator narratives, and to focus attention instead on a pervasive sense of powerlessness. Postwar Japanese children came to abhor war, and there is no question that pacifism is a strongly held sentiment in Japan, but by coming to see their parents as powerless, Japanese children have developed little understanding of how effective resistance against an unjust authority might be mounted or even justified..
Let me quote Hashimoto at length on this point because it goes to the heart of why it matters so much for present day politics, "A pervasive sense of inefficacy, shaped by accounts of defeat, is part of what forms the narrow apolitical vision of the postwar generation...This problem of inefficacy also makes sense when we realize that postwar pacifism failed to train postwar citizens to think about, or even imagine, the legitimate means of resistance to a military machine at war...This prescription to delegitimize aggression and belligerence declawed the citizens, and also deprived them of the legitimate means to act against authority when needed" (47-48).
And here we come to one of the most striking differences between the West German case, and indeed any Western case in relationship to German fascism and World War II, and Japan -resistance. This is the non-barking dog in Hashimoto's narrative, which would have been fascinating for her to explore in this book. In every single case related to German fascism, there is now, today, a celebration of the resistance against an obvious evil. The national resistance against German fascism is celebrated in Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Denmark, everywhere. In Japan, one would assume based on postwar discussions that there had been no resistance at all, which was not the case. Indeed, in Hashimoto's fascinating discussion of school textbooks and popular culture, the Japanese wartime resistance is never discussed. Why?
Hashimoto does not address this question in this text, but there are ample suggestions as to why this is the case in her other writings about Japanese families, as well as the writings of others on Japan. For example, in her essay, "Culture, Power, and Filial Piety in Japan," she writes, "that the child comes to understand that rebellion is useless, that it results in defeat, and that she/he is powerless to do otherwise than acquiesce." 1 Similarly, Masao Maruyama wrote in his classic essay, "Theory and Psychology of Ultra-Nationalism," of how even Japanese liberals could not conceive of violating the central tenets of filial piety.
2 Saburo Ienaga also puzzled over the lack of Japanese wartime resistance in his book, The Pacific War, 1931 War, -1945 . Ienaga wrote about the examples he could find, but most of them involved passive resistance and withdrawal, rather than active resistance. Those that did take an active resistance role tended to be Christian converts, notes Ienaga. 3 The reason for this, according to Robert Bellah and Hashimoto is that Christianity provided converts with a transcendent view of the ultimate truth, which went beyond the existing social order dominated by the principle of filial piety. 4 It gave them a moral justification for their resistance. Ienaga hoped that the Japanese would draw upon the examples of wartime resistance as a way to learn about how one can and should resist unjust authority. But even today, the Japanese wartime resistance is almost wholly ignored.
And this brings us back to why The Long Defeat is such a significant contribution to the literature --Hashimoto's cultural analysis, her focus on the micro-level and the family, and the emphasis upon the fact that the way in which collective memory formation takes shape in nonWestern countries may be significantly different from those in Western countries, which
